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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI NUMBER 2

San Francisco: Contest of Ideas

SAN FRANCISCO — The San Francisco peace treaty signed by 48 nations brought to a close six years of Japanese occupation, eleven months of treaty negotiations and four days of vigorous speech-making. The treaty sponsors had considerable reason to claim victory. Except for three Communist states, formal approval by the participating nations was unanimous, including even such doubtful countries as Indonesia. The conference schedule, moreover, was maintained with a minimum of Soviet disruption. All Communist amendments and delaying attempts were halted by a tough policy based on the thesis that this was a conference to ratify, not to prepare, a treaty.

This Western victory, however, cannot be considered unqualified. The refusal of India and Burma to attend, the absence of China and the obvious reluctance with which some delegations signed the treaty highlighted current problems of Western disunity as well as the precarious relationship between the United States and the Far East. The Soviet bloc operated with these points in mind, hoping for future dividends.

The treaty was characterized by its leading

proponents as one based on justice, reconciliation and peace, and by the Communists as an illegal plot dedicated to militarism, imperialism and war, with certain other groups inclined to take a less positive view in either direction. In essence, the conference debate reflected the attempt of each side to capture three important symbolisms—peace, nationalism and democracy. Beginning with President Truman's opening address, the anti-Communist nations emphasized their desire for peace, their record as opposed to that of the Communists and the present necessity for collective security against Communist aggression. With reference to the treaty, the President declared: "Japan becomes part of the community of nations pledged to outlaw aggression and to support world order based on justice."

The Russian countercharge was summed up by Andrei Gromyko on the morning of the signing: "They are sowing seeds of a new war . . . they are making cannon fodder of the Japanese people to promote American aggression." Citing the Korean war as an example of that aggression, the Soviet bloc constantly hammered the theme that the

OCTOBER 1, 1951

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

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United States was seeking to expand the Asian conflict, force Japan into war with Russia and China and dominate the Far East through military power.

Similarly the issue of support for nationalism was omnipresent in the debate. The Communist delegates played on it in a variety of ways. They charged that the entire conference was an illegal "American dictate," with great pressure being used to force agreement on the smaller nations and with the national interests of Asia, including Japan, being sacrificed. The Communist punch-line was the statement that this was a Far Eastern settlement which left represented most of Asia's people.

Battle of Symbolisms

The rebuttals to these charges were equally vigorous. The conference background was sketched to demonstrate the wide range of opinions solicited and the compromises effected to secure unity. The procedures followed were defended as the only method of avoiding a Communist-inspired stalemate, thereby perpetuating the occupation. Soviet sincerity was directly challenged on the score that originally Russia had insisted on a peace settlement through the Council of Foreign Ministers, thus excluding all small nations. This point was broadened into a general attack on Communist imperialism.

Merged with these arguments was the issue of democracy. Many non-Communist speakers defended American policies in general and the occupation specifically, voiced faith in the future of Japanese democracy,

and took the offensive to accuse the Communists of denying to their own people what they piously demanded for others. The Soviet delegates, using the term democracy with their own connotations, pledged themselves to continuing leadership of "the peace-loving, democratic peoples of the world." They denounced the reactionary West, demanded democratic guarantees for the Japanese people, repudiation of the occupation and recognition for the "new democracy" of China.

The conference debate was at its height when the U.S.S.R. proposed thirteen amendments artfully drafted to obtain maximum approval, especially in Asia. These included proposals which recognized Chinese, Russian and Japanese sovereignty over Formosa, the south Sakhalin-Kurile and Ryukyu-Bonin areas respectively; provided permanent withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japan; recognized Japanese reparation responsibilities without qualification as to type; specified the strengthening of civil liberties and safeguards against fascism in Japan; called for the participation of Red China and the U.S.S.R. in any peace settlement; and rigorously limited Japanese rearmament to token forces for defense, banning all "aggressive" weapons and alliances directed against World War II allies.

The Soviet "amendments" were not allowed to come to a vote, and undoubtedly they would have been heavily defeated in any case. That many of them were in accord with the sentiments of certain non-Communist countries, however, cannot be

denied. Two factors contributed much to the solidarity shown in San Francisco: an unwillingness to be aligned with the Soviet bloc and the desire for continued American friendship and aid. Perhaps our greatest asset was the record of Communist action—past and present.

The U. S. Role

The conference was symbolic of the new role which the United States now assumes in the world. Long-range success depends on a careful review of each major move. Even while celebrating diplomatic victory, the American people must be keenly aware of the enormous sacrifices made by certain nations to provide us with unity and of the danger signals which these sacrifices represent. Obviously Asia is a present focal spot of ideological as well as military battle, and Asia still hangs in the balance. The symbolisms of peace, nationalism and democracy assume great importance in the contest. Indeed, the present international debates are arguments over ideals to an extent unprecedented in history. In this context each side must defend both its domestic and foreign policies, as the conference debate clearly showed. And each side must appeal to peoples even more than to governments. Victory can be made more permanent and more real only if the United States keeps these points in mind in implementing the Japanese treaty.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

(Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, attended the San Francisco Conference.)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC.; 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: SPRUILL BRADEN • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES, BROOKS EMEY, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; BLAIR BOLLES, Washington Correspondent; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor; FELICE NOVICH, Assistant Editor. The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Entered as second-class matter on March 31, 1931 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.



Military Strength of NATO

WASHINGTON—When General George C. Marshall resigned as Secretary of Defense on September 12, the national military policy of the United States was ready for review. The operation of the draft and the sight of many men in uniform emphasize the tremendous growth of the American armed forces during Marshall's year in office. The pre-Korea army of 837,000 is close to 1,500,000; the Navy of 460,000 has become almost 800,000; and the Air Force has grown from 415,000 to 787,000 in 16 months.

The primary issue before the military establishment now is whether America is putting sufficient stress on air power. Congressional interest in enlarging the Air Force indicates the likelihood that the principle of "balanced forces" which James V. Forrestal adopted when he became the first Secretary of Defense in 1947 may be abandoned, that the bombing strength of the Air Force will be increased on the assumption that it is the first and principal line of defense and offense, and that tactical air strength will be transferred to the Army by the Air Force in order to free the latter of direct responsibility for the protection of ground forces. These decisions will have to be made in time by General Marshall's successor, Robert A. Lovett, who was Marshall's Deputy Secretary. Lovett during World War II was Assistant Secretary of War for Air and is said to believe that the bomber plane is still America's best weapon.

The restlessness in Congress about military matters underlies a general disappointment in Washington with the slow progress of the United

States and its allies toward their goal of balancing the military strength of the Soviet Union. At the present rate of speed this goal may yet be two years off.

Economic Nationalism A Hurdle

A major reason for the delay is that military progress has outrun the progress in developing economic policies for the support of military strength. The economic policy of the United States is growing nationalistic at a time when military policy is squarely based on collaboration with allies.

The preoccupation with protecting the national economy from foreign competition has distracted the United States from the foreign economic problems connected with the international military program. The United States has encouraged members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to set up the European army under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, but it has not faced the problems arising out of the effort to create an international military force among nations which politically and economically remain sovereign and distinct. Differences from country to country in military pay scales, in availability of supplies, in investment in military equipment, and in the size of national budgets slow down the development of Eisenhower's army. So does the inability of the North Atlantic pact powers (including the United States) to establish a common system for equitably distributing the raw materials that are indispensable to the armaments industry. In its present nationalistic temper, the United States may not be

prepared for the economic problems connected with the transformation of Japan into a military partner of the West after the new peace treaty and the ancillary Japanese-American security agreement go into effect. Japan needs to revive trade with continental (Communist) China or greatly to expand trade with the United States in order to survive economically and function as a useful bulwark of Western security. Yet producers of some American goods that can be manufactured in Japan have commented since the signing of the Japanese treaty in San Francisco that they will object if Japan ships those items to the United States in large quantities.

Suggestions which the United States makes from time to time that our allies and partners should collaborate economically are weakened by economic nationalism here. Our allies' concern with economic problems, which has been glossed over in the first year of the drive for rearmament, overshadowed the immediate military problems discussed at the Ottawa conference, such as General Eisenhower's request for larger national contributions of manpower to the European army, the relation of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic treaty, and the continuing interest of the United States in working out with Britain and France an arrangement for a German contribution of troops to the European army. Changes in United States national military policy cannot advance the Western coalition toward its goal of strength until the United States focuses seriously on the economic problems of our friends abroad.

BLAIR BOLLES



Atlantic Community Economics

The historic series of international conferences held during September revealed a strong sense of Western unity on strategic, diplomatic and political aims. It also demonstrated some of the divergences within the Western coalition as to the economic means of achieving these aims.

Impressive signs of unity were evident at the San Francisco conference, during the Washington talks of the Big Three foreign ministers and at the Ottawa North Atlantic Council meeting. A subsequent NATO conference in Rome in October and the November opening of the UN General Assembly in Paris will provide further opportunities for continuing this basic harmony on high policy. The Assembly may even prove the occasion for testing the West's new strength and confidence in negotiations with the Soviet Union—if this show of strength and unity has impressed Moscow as its architects have hoped it would.

Economic Fissures

Although the United States and its partners are pleased to report progress, they are not satisfied that the present strength of the North Atlantic coalition is sufficient to alter the Kremlin's will. The facade of agreement at Washington and Ottawa was marked by some economic fissures. At Ottawa new attention was focused on Article 2 of the North Atlantic treaty, which states that the signatories "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

During September clashes in economic policies emerged both within

and without the NATO framework. President Truman opened the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington on September 10 with a plea that fund members refrain from using present difficulties "to justify restrictions on trade and exchange which are not actually needed to further the program of mutual defense," but the meeting ended on September 14 without moving toward the Administration's goal. British Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell warned that the current drain on British gold and dollar reserves may bring about tightened restrictions rather than the reverse.

For a variety of reasons, Washington has been backed into the position of doing little more than paying lip service to freer multilateral trade as a long-range goal. United States representatives at the session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which opened at Geneva on September 17, were working under two handicaps. One was Congress' recent action in imposing import quotas on butter and cheese, a protectionist move that has troubled Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada. The other was the American decision to bar the benefits of the general agreement to one of its signatories, Czechoslovakia, in an effort to obtain the release of William N. Oatis, Associated Press correspondent imprisoned by Prague.

United States efforts to restrict East-West trade by other methods have also proved a source of friction with Western European nations.

During August the Administration succeeded in putting through both houses of Congress the Battle bill, which leaves the President discretionary powers in continuing American aid to countries which send goods militarily useful in the secondary sense to Iron Curtain nations. This bill was a substitute for the strengthened Kém amendment which would have halted United States aid unless the recipients rigidly curtailed their exports to the Soviet bloc. Despite congressional action, this issue continues to arouse controversy: Europeans maintain that the Battle bill infringes the spirit of equal partnership in strengthening the West, while Administration critics are far from pleased with such activities as Anglo-Soviet trade.

Equality of Sacrifice

Even more fundamental than these issues is the need to find standards for measuring and apportioning the sacrifices to be made by members of the Atlantic community. It is apparent, for instance, that the European members of NATO, with their lean economies, are not capable of matching the American defense effort, which currently amounts to 18 per cent of the gross national product. But somewhere an assessment must be made so that national responsibilities might be better fixed, so that the United States will be able to apportion its foreign aid program more equitably between military and economic assistance, and so that disappointments arising from the failure to achieve unrealistic goals will not sap Western morale at a time when it is showing signs of growth.

WILLIAM W. WADE



The Muslims and the West

by Wilfred Cantwell Smith

Dr. Smith, professor of comparative religion at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, has been appointed director of a newly created institute of Islamic studies at that university. He is at present visiting Turkey, Pakistan and India. Dr. Smith is the author of several works on Islam, notably *Modern Islam in India—A Social Analysis*, rev. ed. (London, Gollancz, 1947).

Many in the West, concerned with their own chief problem, have persuaded themselves that the world is divided into two great segments: the West and the Soviet Union. If pressed, they must recognize that as a matter of fact there is in the world a "third area"—Asia. This additional factor, however, is usually conceived as only temporarily disrupting the great dichotomy. China, it is noted by Westerners, has already fallen into the pattern; although from our point of view it has chosen the wrong side. With other peoples of the Orient Western analysts easily become impatient as they wait for them to line up on one side or the other so as to restore the simplicity of a bipolar world. And the Western powers expend their foreign policy energy and money in endeavoring to pull these doubtful areas into "our" orbit.

Bipolar—or Complex World?

This world-dualism in thinking may well prove fallacious and exceedingly costly in the case of China; it is certainly a faulty approach to the rest of Asia. The world is not so simple. And such a self-centered view cannot but miss essential facts. The greatest oversimplification that may legitimately be permitted is to reduce mankind to three major socio-cultural complexes besides ourselves and the Russians: China, India and Islam. Each has its own solidarity, and its own self-centeredness. Their relations to the West are not, for them, incidental to the West's relations with a third party.

The civilization of Islam is now some 14 centuries old. It differs in many fundamentals from Western civilization, although the two also have much in common—more in common than the West has with any other major world culture. As is well known, this does not always lead to mutual understanding. It is significant that the two civilizations, throughout Islam's history, have shared a common frontier—which has meant that they have been constantly in contact and often in open conflict. It is doubtful whether the effect of the Crusades—two centuries of bitter ideological aggressive warfare—has ever quite worn off; neither has the effect of the Ottoman Empire's growth and its near-misses at carrying Islam into the heart of Europe (the occupation of Constantinople, 1453; the two sieges of Vienna, 1529 and 1683). More profoundly, it is doubtful whether Christendom, affecting even those unaware that they are involved in such things, has ever quite forgiven Islam for explicitly, albeit without understanding, repudiating Christianity's central doctrine.

Islam, it is well known, appeared in the seventh century A.D. in Mecca. It is not, however, and never was, a desert religion. It originated in Arabia's chief city, a sophisticated commercial center, and became great, in a worldly sense, when it was taken over by the age-old cultural centers of the Near East: The men of what had been the East Roman and the Persian Empires, who for centuries had been experimenting—not too

successfully—with Hellenism and a revived Zoroastrianism, took to Islam with fervor. They learned a new language and began to dream new dreams. Tired of mutual warfare, they replaced their old imperial systems with a new Arabic empire which they jointly built. They set forth on new commercial ventures and established an immense religious, cultural and economic order stretching from the Pyrenees to the Himalayas, larger than the Roman Empire at its height. With centers at Cordoba and Baghdad, later at Cairo and Samarkand, they raised mosques and schools, wrote poetry and letters-of-credit, and ventured on the rudiments of science.

Islam and Christianity

Three aspects of early Islamic culture are particularly striking. It was (1) successful, (2) homogeneous, (3) religious.

The Muslim conquerors rode forth in triumph and gave to their new religion an association which has colored it ever since: a tie with power and success. During Islam's formative first centuries they expanded its domain and its wealth beyond all preconception and constructed a new law, a new society, a new civilization. Christianity, by contrast, was launched in a world already organized, and its formative centuries were spent under oppression. It began, in significant measure, as the religion of the proletariat of the Roman Empire. It was a religion of triumph out of suffering, of salvation in the midst of defeat. Islam, on the

other hand, although it is many things to different men, had from the beginning a distinct note of triumph in success, of salvation through conquest and worldly power. The Muslim community learned to expect God's favor in return for serving Him, in this world as well as in the next.

There were, certainly, many individual exceptions: the whole Sufi movement in Islam arose from among pious people who renounced worldly success. These, however, were individuals not congregated into groups or recognized authoritatively until later centuries.

Integration Through Religion

The Muslim process of constructing a civilization was successful not only in the sense of quickly attaining impressive political and economic mastery. It succeeded also, to a remarkable degree and again within a fairly short period of time, in integrating life into that wholeness which constitutes a culture. Many elements went into the making of Islamic civilization. The achievement of the Muslims was that they welded these into a homogeneous way of life. The Islamic form was given to each aspect of living, whatever its content. The center of this unifying force was the law, the most essential creation of Islamic civilization, regulating within its powerful and precise sweep everything from prayer rites to property rights. The law gave unity to Islamic society, from Spain to Central Asia; it also gave unity to the individual Muslim, his entire life activity being organized into a meaningful whole by this divine pattern.

Again, the contact with Western Christendom is important. The difference at this point has too many ramifications and is too subtle for any but lengthy analysis. Suffice it to call

attention here to the fact that Western civilization has two main sources, which have perhaps never wholly been integrated: the Greco-Roman, and the Judeo-Christian. These two traditions—whether fused or in uneasy tension or in conflict—together comprise the Western heritage. As already pointed out, in this case the religion began within a society already organized, whose law and political processes continued alongside the development of Christianity. The result was the existence, lasting to this day, of both a church and a state. Within society at large and also within the life of the individual person certain aspects, whatever their content, have a secular form (from the Greco-Roman tradition) — politics, for instance, and grammar — while other aspects come under the religious pattern. Thus, even the community organization of Christians is done in two ways, religious and secular.

Third, as already suggested—and this is basic—Islam's integration was achieved through religion. It was not that religion was an integral part of life and of society, so much as that society and life on this earth were an integral part of the Muslim's religion. It was not so much that religion controlled the rest of life, in the sense that would be true if, within the conflict known to the West between religious and temporal, the religious should win out and dominate. Rather, religion was the pattern within a carefully structured system. It was religion that made Islamic civilization great.

The system worked well for some centuries. Within the rise and fall of world powers which colors man's story on earth, the Islamic empire rose and flourished awhile. And then, as other civilizations have done, it began to weaken. In the thirteenth century, along with the Crusades

from the West, came the much greater menace, the Mongol invasions from the East. Baghdad fell before Jenghiz Khan's grandson in 1258. As often in such cases, there was an inner weakening first. It seemed for a time that these events had dealt Islam a shattering blow, bringing not only devastation physically but the culmination of disintegration. The difficulty is that if one's civilization is religious, and one's religion cultural, then a defeat on the battlefield or an economic dislocation may mean a spiritual crisis. If one's whole life is integrated, a blow on the head may strike also at the heart.

Decline and Revival

However, Islam survived this challenge. It did so, partly by making converts of the Mongol conquerors—an immense triumph, comparable from the Muslim point of view to what would happen today if the Western imperialists who have brown-beaten Islam politically should now turn Muslim; partly by developing certain elements of resilience within the religion, for example the Sufi (mystic) movement.

The Arabs did not recapture their earlier glory, although Cairo, never subdued by the Mongols, flourished in independence for another two and a half centuries. However, other Muslim peoples came forward to carry the torch. And indeed at about this time Islam by missionary effort was entering on a second wave of expansion almost as impressive as the first, spreading into Africa, into Asia Minor and Eastern Europe, and into India and the East Indies. By the sixteenth century the Turks under the Ottomans, the Persians under the Safavids, the Indian Muslims under the Mughals, were brilliantly powerful. Once again Islam was radiant and its religious culture flourished. By this time, it is true, it had lost its

unity: the three empires mentioned were disparate segments. But each was mighty, and unafraid.

Then came the denouement. By the eighteenth century a decline had set in. Europe, meanwhile, was plunging ahead on the greatest upsurge of power and vigor that the world had ever seen. The Dutch, the French, the British, spread their empires around the world. Muslim worldly power crumbled before the guns and ambitions of this new and largely secular community. Finally one of the most crucial differences between Islam and the West became that the Islamic world had the memory of having been mighty, the West had the sense of being mighty now.

Islam's memory remained no mere dream. For a time, it is true, outside observers believed the Muslim peoples to be asleep, if not moribund. "Decadence" was a word readily applied during the nineteenth century; somnolence, at least, seemed patent. Weakness and rigidity were everywhere pointed to by critics of Islam.

Yet something was stirring. For small groups of forceful, devoted men here and there in the Muslim countries throughout the century, the memory of greatness became an inspiration to revive that greatness. Their societies were somnolent but not impervious to the appeal to Islam. First there was the call to purify the religion; saying that the Muslim community had become weak and backward because it had lost the pristine clarity of Islam. Gradually movements appeared, in virtually each segment of the Islamic world, to revitalize the religion and to reconstruct the earthly greatness of their civilization. Not twin purposes, but two facets of the same objective. Islam, Muslims ardently believed, would once again be great on earth.

Today we are in the midst of this


revival. From Turkey to Pakistan, from Morocco to Indonesia, there is an upsurge of Islamic vitality. Islamic civilization in the twentieth century or the twenty-first is not, at least in the eyes of the educated leaders, to be a precise replica of its past. On the contrary, it shall be "modern, scientific, progressive." But it shall be Islamic. Their new order, which Muslims are increasingly keen to construct, is to have a continuity with their past—dynamic, flexible, but their own.

Whether the Muslim peoples will be able to fulfill their dream—to

ber also that for the past two or three centuries the chief threat to the Islamic community has been posed by the menace of the West itself.

In the new cosmopolitan world in which we find ourselves the West has to learn to live not only side by side with the Russians but also in some kind of relationship with the other civilizations that share the planet with us. The Muslims, too, have to learn this art; neither they nor we find it easy. In modern Islam, too, there is a strong isolationism—the emotional reaction of that group who wish that the world

The Muslim World



build a continuation of their own Islamic history which will incorporate enough industrialization, a powerful political structure and various other features to be viable in the modern world—remains to be seen. As a matter of fact, it remains to be seen whether any of us will survive in the embattled and friable world of modernity. The Muslims' problem depends not only on the future of communism, the sole overt threat to the West's civilization, but also on a whole series of other problems, which in their eyes are of no less urgency or magnitude. These problems are economic, political, educational and even spiritual. It is salutary for the West to remem-

ber that for the past two or three centuries the chief threat to the Islamic community has been posed by the menace of the West itself. In the new cosmopolitan world in which we find ourselves the West has to learn to live not only side by side with the Russians but also in some kind of relationship with the other civilizations that share the planet with us. The Muslims, too, have to learn this art; neither they nor we find it easy. In modern Islam, too, there is a strong isolationism—the emotional reaction of that group who wish that the world

would leave Islam alone. But the world will leave none of us alone. Nor is the next simplest solution available: we in the West cannot make the world over in our image. For modern living, each civilization must evolve—perhaps with great labor—a new ingredient: compatibility.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Sir T. W. Arnold, *Preaching of Islam*, 2nd ed. (London, Constable, 1913); Sir T. W. Arnold and A. Guillaume, eds., *The Legacy of Islam* (London, Oxford, 1931); H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey* (London, Home University Library, 1949); Gustave E. von Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946); Reuben Levy, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Islam* (London, Williams & Norgate, 1931 and 1933), 2 vols.; Wilfred C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India—A Social Analysis*, rev. ed. (London, Gollancz, 1947).

As Others See Us

Commenting on plans for a Middle East defense pact, the *Overseas Hindustan Times* of New Delhi, which represents the views of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Congress party, said editorially on July 5: "The defense of the Middle East is truly the concern of the countries that lie in or about this region from Turkey to India. It can be evolved collectively if the Western nations first decide to remove all traces of political domination in their relationship with these countries. Then a larger conference of the countries concerned could be called and the representatives of the U.S.A. and Britain could attend it to offer arms and training and such equipment and supplies as would help these countries to raise the standard of living of their people. . . . The whole question of the Middle East, as indeed of the Far East and Southeast Asia, deserves to be considered afresh. Something like the Marshall aid outlook in the larger cause of human brotherhood should make a difference in the West's dealings with the East."

In the pro-government *Le Figaro*, Raymond Aron, a well-known French commentator who is most

outspokenly favorable to the United States, wrote on August 9: "The free half of Europe is today trying to re-establish a local equilibrium. As the latter is impossible without German participation, the rearmament of West Germany within the framework of an Atlantic or a European army must take place despite past events and legitimate anxieties. It is not only a short-term necessity; it is also a condition of the 'European settlement' which will some day take place. The details of such a settlement cannot now be foreseen, but the withdrawal of the Russian army within the frontiers of the Soviet

Union might have as its counterpart the departure of some or all of the American troops. An agreement of this kind presupposes that the European countries have regained sufficient military strength. For many reasons it is not desirable for the presence of American divisions in Europe to be considered permanent. At some future date European nations must be capable not of parting from the United States, which will remain the arsenal and the center of the Atlantic coalition, but of maintaining alone the equilibrium of Europe."



FPA Bookshelf

RECENT BOOKS ON KOREA

American Military Government in Korea, by E. Grant Meade. New York, King's Crown Press, 1951. \$3.75.

This detailed study of all aspects of the military government operation in one Korean province during the critical period of 1945-46 by one who both observed and participated in the events of which he writes is valuable for an understanding of the Korean situation as well as of general problems of public administration, especially in an occupied country.

The Koreans and Their Culture, by Cornelius Osgood. New York, Ronald Press, 1951. \$5.

A major contribution to comprehension not only of the present crisis in Korea but also of the Korean people, possessors of an

important yet little-known history and culture. This comprehensive study, by a professor of anthropology at Yale University, offers a unique combination of the insight to be derived from political, economic and historical materials with that obtained by intensive anthropological field investigation of the family and community life of the people.

Why War Came in Korea, by Robert T. Oliver. New York, Fordham University Press, 1950. \$2.95.

On the basis of long-term personal knowledge of Korea and Koreans, the chairman of the Speech Department at Pennsylvania State College has written an interesting account of developments in Korea preceding the events of June 1950 and has given his own views on the deeper meanings of these events.

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A Foreign Policy Forum

Point Four: Public or Private Aid?

*August Maffry, Vice-President, Irving Trust,
and Seymour E. Harris, Harvard University*

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